http://www.nws.noaa.gov/om/assessments/ ... nadoes.pdf
I am going through it now.
April 27 tornado outbreak - Service assessment released
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CrazyC83
- Professional-Met
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- Joined: Tue Mar 07, 2006 11:57 pm
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Re: April 27 tornado outbreak - Service assessment released
My analysis on the recommendations:
1) A good point, but combining the awareness weeks would also weaken messages. It just happened that April was a brutal month in the US.
2) Private spotter training should be done annually, before the peak season, with refresher courses. NWS training should be as budgets warrant.
3) It shouldn't be an issue anymore, but it is. All stations should stream during peak storm events, and access to the entire CWA should be available. Morristown should not be limited to Knoxville.
4) Mobile radars should be available and set up when repairs or failures occur during critical periods. While that was not necessary here, it could have been if the 26th was the bad day in Tennessee.
5) Tertiary backups should indeed be located far from the severe weather. Also, regional HQs should be allowed to designate one-time backups for major events (in the case of Birmingham unable to use Peachtree City or Huntsville, another office like Tallahassee could step in as Florida avoided the outbreak for the most part).
6) In such a catastrophic outbreak, it should be all hands on deck. Although WFOs did a great job, there is always room for improvement.
7) Again, this comes down to mobile transmitters and equipment. They should be available on short notice.
8) It's computerized I thought? That is hard to do with so little notice.
9) In this outbreak, almost every warning called for a Tornado Emergency. It should have been clear, but still bugs to work out.
10) Agreed, ground truth should override radar indications. If a debris ball makes it obvious, just issue a Tornado Emergency if there is ground truth.
11) What's so bad about the SPC issuing a new watch? Especially if it needed to be PDS or if it needed an upgrade to PDS. Such was especially an issue on April 15 when NO PDS watches were issued (at least 2 should have been).
12) Huntsville did a great job with the Special Weather Statements for a heads-up on dangerous tornadoes 1 to 3 hours away. Middle-term advice should always be provided like that.
13) Agreed, need to upgrade radars to minimize confusion.
14) Quite hard for the NWS to reach with social media on such a fast-paced event. The NHC did a good job with Irene, but for short-term warnings?
15) Every county is different. Of course they won't have identical programming! They just need to do a great job each.
16) Not every EF4 or EF5 tornado is a massive wedge, so they shouldn't judge by size! (Take, for example, Elie, Manitoba EF5 in 2007.) Also they come in many shapes and formations as well.
17) I think an experimental path probability should be investigated, like with hurricanes. They should have a large cone of uncertainty though, at least initially, covering up to 2 hours.
18) Here it gets personal. That is one problem that everyone runs into! Who would have thought, on the first day of a Florida vacation driving down, I would run into one of the 210 or so tornadoes that day! Luckily it wasn't as strong as the tornadoes down there, but it goes to show that no one is immune! And an EF4 or EF5 tornado WILL destroy your house if the core passes over you! I was IN the hard-hit areas less than 36 hours after the outbreak, and my story was able to spread too as I tried to help out in the limited time.
19) Agreed. Extreme measures are needed to survive violent tornadoes. Going to an interior room on the lowest floor is NOT sufficient in an EF4 or EF5 (it works well up to EF2 and okay in an EF3). Every tornado needs to be taken on an individual basis.
20) Red tape needs to be cut!
21) That is not the NWS's responsibility, but up to local charities and agencies. Still, they need to be well-coordinated.
22) Any maps should not be WFO-specific when it comes to mapping tornadoes, as they do not respect political boundaries. In extreme cases, they should even ignore international boundaries.
23) Same issue as 22. WFOs should collaborate on surveys of boundary-crossing tornadoes.
24) That is why there are QRT's to look at extreme tornadoes. Evidence from past high-intensity tornadoes (i.e. Greensburg) should also be used as comparisons.
April 22 in St. Louis
D-1) That goes back to having the capabilities ready. Unlike April 27, this was not a widespread event so less staff is more reasonable.
D-2) Agreed there, accuracy is key.
D-3) That needs to reach the point that 911 should be for life-threatening situations only! Reporting damage when everyone is okay is not a 911 situation. Seriously injured people IS a 911 situation.
D-4) That could have easily been a horrific tragedy in the airport. They were lucky the tornado weakened (it was EF2 intensity at the time). Large venues, especially in tornado-prone areas, need preparedness plans! (That goes to the next set...)
April 16 in North Carolina
E-1) That is not uncommon. The PDS words don't seem to resonate with the general community. That needs to change in extreme outbreak situations, they need to know the danger!
E-2) Agreed, every additional source available is key to get the word out! Lives are at stake!
E-3) That goes back to earlier points.
E-4) Won't the upgraded systems solve that problem?
E-5) Flights are often critical to analyze damage in rural areas. That option always needs to be available from the regional offices.
E-6) In their defence, these WFOs are not used to such extreme outbreaks. But still they could contact other WFOs for assistance, those used to surveying large-scale tornado disasters.
1) A good point, but combining the awareness weeks would also weaken messages. It just happened that April was a brutal month in the US.
2) Private spotter training should be done annually, before the peak season, with refresher courses. NWS training should be as budgets warrant.
3) It shouldn't be an issue anymore, but it is. All stations should stream during peak storm events, and access to the entire CWA should be available. Morristown should not be limited to Knoxville.
4) Mobile radars should be available and set up when repairs or failures occur during critical periods. While that was not necessary here, it could have been if the 26th was the bad day in Tennessee.
5) Tertiary backups should indeed be located far from the severe weather. Also, regional HQs should be allowed to designate one-time backups for major events (in the case of Birmingham unable to use Peachtree City or Huntsville, another office like Tallahassee could step in as Florida avoided the outbreak for the most part).
6) In such a catastrophic outbreak, it should be all hands on deck. Although WFOs did a great job, there is always room for improvement.
7) Again, this comes down to mobile transmitters and equipment. They should be available on short notice.
8) It's computerized I thought? That is hard to do with so little notice.
9) In this outbreak, almost every warning called for a Tornado Emergency. It should have been clear, but still bugs to work out.
10) Agreed, ground truth should override radar indications. If a debris ball makes it obvious, just issue a Tornado Emergency if there is ground truth.
11) What's so bad about the SPC issuing a new watch? Especially if it needed to be PDS or if it needed an upgrade to PDS. Such was especially an issue on April 15 when NO PDS watches were issued (at least 2 should have been).
12) Huntsville did a great job with the Special Weather Statements for a heads-up on dangerous tornadoes 1 to 3 hours away. Middle-term advice should always be provided like that.
13) Agreed, need to upgrade radars to minimize confusion.
14) Quite hard for the NWS to reach with social media on such a fast-paced event. The NHC did a good job with Irene, but for short-term warnings?
15) Every county is different. Of course they won't have identical programming! They just need to do a great job each.
16) Not every EF4 or EF5 tornado is a massive wedge, so they shouldn't judge by size! (Take, for example, Elie, Manitoba EF5 in 2007.) Also they come in many shapes and formations as well.
17) I think an experimental path probability should be investigated, like with hurricanes. They should have a large cone of uncertainty though, at least initially, covering up to 2 hours.
18) Here it gets personal. That is one problem that everyone runs into! Who would have thought, on the first day of a Florida vacation driving down, I would run into one of the 210 or so tornadoes that day! Luckily it wasn't as strong as the tornadoes down there, but it goes to show that no one is immune! And an EF4 or EF5 tornado WILL destroy your house if the core passes over you! I was IN the hard-hit areas less than 36 hours after the outbreak, and my story was able to spread too as I tried to help out in the limited time.
19) Agreed. Extreme measures are needed to survive violent tornadoes. Going to an interior room on the lowest floor is NOT sufficient in an EF4 or EF5 (it works well up to EF2 and okay in an EF3). Every tornado needs to be taken on an individual basis.
20) Red tape needs to be cut!
21) That is not the NWS's responsibility, but up to local charities and agencies. Still, they need to be well-coordinated.
22) Any maps should not be WFO-specific when it comes to mapping tornadoes, as they do not respect political boundaries. In extreme cases, they should even ignore international boundaries.
23) Same issue as 22. WFOs should collaborate on surveys of boundary-crossing tornadoes.
24) That is why there are QRT's to look at extreme tornadoes. Evidence from past high-intensity tornadoes (i.e. Greensburg) should also be used as comparisons.
April 22 in St. Louis
D-1) That goes back to having the capabilities ready. Unlike April 27, this was not a widespread event so less staff is more reasonable.
D-2) Agreed there, accuracy is key.
D-3) That needs to reach the point that 911 should be for life-threatening situations only! Reporting damage when everyone is okay is not a 911 situation. Seriously injured people IS a 911 situation.
D-4) That could have easily been a horrific tragedy in the airport. They were lucky the tornado weakened (it was EF2 intensity at the time). Large venues, especially in tornado-prone areas, need preparedness plans! (That goes to the next set...)
April 16 in North Carolina
E-1) That is not uncommon. The PDS words don't seem to resonate with the general community. That needs to change in extreme outbreak situations, they need to know the danger!
E-2) Agreed, every additional source available is key to get the word out! Lives are at stake!
E-3) That goes back to earlier points.
E-4) Won't the upgraded systems solve that problem?
E-5) Flights are often critical to analyze damage in rural areas. That option always needs to be available from the regional offices.
E-6) In their defence, these WFOs are not used to such extreme outbreaks. But still they could contact other WFOs for assistance, those used to surveying large-scale tornado disasters.
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CrazyC83
- Professional-Met
- Posts: 34001
- Joined: Tue Mar 07, 2006 11:57 pm
- Location: Deep South, for the first time!
The biggest lesson learned - the "cry wolf" factor. Many people believe that tornadoes are such small things (compared to a hurricane or a winter storm) that it can't happen to them. FALSE!
Sure, even with a large and extremely dangerous tornado not far away, there is not a 100% chance you will get hit, or even close to that (unlike with a hurricane on the doorstep). But it is NOT zero! I learned that firsthand on April 27 myself being in one of the 210 tornadoes that day - directly. But there were thousands of others that lost everything, in many cases, their lives.
Another lesson I think is the NWS warning process. Too often, they make the warning text the same all the time (i.e. take shelter in an interior room - since basements are rare in many regions). That works very well in low to mid-strength tornadoes up to EF2 for sure (EF3 in solidly-built houses). But these were confirmed extremely large and violent tornadoes - extremely strong preparation language is necessary. In a house that sustains EF4 or EF5 damage, you need to be in a reinforced storm shelter or underground - deeply - in order to ensure survival.
In conclusion, unlike with the Joplin tornado which was an absolute nightmare scenario of a quick-spinning monster, I think the death toll was higher than it needed to be here. Warning times were not an issue (unlike with Joplin), time of day was not an issue with most of the real deadly tornadoes (they were all in the afternoon and early evening for the most part, unlike some past tragedies) and time of year was not an issue (unlike, say, February 5, 2008).
It was a case of several things coming together:
1) Numerous tornadoes stronger than survivable with normal construction. Most frame houses can make it through up to an EF2 with an excellent chance of the occupants surviving, and an EF3 in some cases, but not any higher. That, however, is beyond the control of the NWS and governments, and up to individuals. Do they want a house that can withstand an EF5 tornado, or at least a room? The sad part is that such is so expensive and few people can afford it these days.
2) Perception of risk. It was a very well-warned day, with a High Risk of severe weather and really played up for 3 days. The previous days - April 25 and 26 - were also highly active so there was a sense of its potential already. But again, people probably had the thought "it couldn't happen here".
3) The first round of severe weather - the QLCS with many embedded tornadoes as strong as EF3 - may have created a perception the threat had passed. Also that cut power to hundreds of thousands, including in some communities devastated that afternoon. It may have prevented getting the message out, especially since a radio transmitter was hit by one of the tornadoes.
4) The "Katrina effect" may have also come into play. There was likely a false sense of security that such extreme death tolls couldn't happen anymore. Before Katrina, it had been over 30 years since a hurricane even killed 100 people, and likewise with tornado outbreaks the same thing - more than 35 years had passed since such. But it is still possible even today with the wrong situations to have extreme death tolls.
Sure, even with a large and extremely dangerous tornado not far away, there is not a 100% chance you will get hit, or even close to that (unlike with a hurricane on the doorstep). But it is NOT zero! I learned that firsthand on April 27 myself being in one of the 210 tornadoes that day - directly. But there were thousands of others that lost everything, in many cases, their lives.
Another lesson I think is the NWS warning process. Too often, they make the warning text the same all the time (i.e. take shelter in an interior room - since basements are rare in many regions). That works very well in low to mid-strength tornadoes up to EF2 for sure (EF3 in solidly-built houses). But these were confirmed extremely large and violent tornadoes - extremely strong preparation language is necessary. In a house that sustains EF4 or EF5 damage, you need to be in a reinforced storm shelter or underground - deeply - in order to ensure survival.
In conclusion, unlike with the Joplin tornado which was an absolute nightmare scenario of a quick-spinning monster, I think the death toll was higher than it needed to be here. Warning times were not an issue (unlike with Joplin), time of day was not an issue with most of the real deadly tornadoes (they were all in the afternoon and early evening for the most part, unlike some past tragedies) and time of year was not an issue (unlike, say, February 5, 2008).
It was a case of several things coming together:
1) Numerous tornadoes stronger than survivable with normal construction. Most frame houses can make it through up to an EF2 with an excellent chance of the occupants surviving, and an EF3 in some cases, but not any higher. That, however, is beyond the control of the NWS and governments, and up to individuals. Do they want a house that can withstand an EF5 tornado, or at least a room? The sad part is that such is so expensive and few people can afford it these days.
2) Perception of risk. It was a very well-warned day, with a High Risk of severe weather and really played up for 3 days. The previous days - April 25 and 26 - were also highly active so there was a sense of its potential already. But again, people probably had the thought "it couldn't happen here".
3) The first round of severe weather - the QLCS with many embedded tornadoes as strong as EF3 - may have created a perception the threat had passed. Also that cut power to hundreds of thousands, including in some communities devastated that afternoon. It may have prevented getting the message out, especially since a radio transmitter was hit by one of the tornadoes.
4) The "Katrina effect" may have also come into play. There was likely a false sense of security that such extreme death tolls couldn't happen anymore. Before Katrina, it had been over 30 years since a hurricane even killed 100 people, and likewise with tornado outbreaks the same thing - more than 35 years had passed since such. But it is still possible even today with the wrong situations to have extreme death tolls.
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