Iraq: U.S Must Keep Eye on the Prize

[stormchazer]

Iraq: U.S Must Keep Eye on the Prize


Monday, November 17, 2003
By Alison Fraser

Recent polls suggest that, for the first time, more than half of Americans don’t approve of President Bush’s handling of the Iraq war, and much of the disaffection has to do with the relentless criticism he’s endured in the press.

But before America’s armada of armchair strategists offer their next assessment on how and why the president’s policies have failed us, they should remember to keep a few key points in mind.

Why is the United States in Iraq? We have legal and moral responsibilities as an occupying power. Historians can debate the wisdom of dethroning Saddam’s regime. But, having invaded the country, U.S. forces have a legal obligation, under international law, to do several things before they leave, most of which fall under what World War II military planners aptly called the “disease and unrest formula.” (search)

They must prevent the outbreak of mass starvation and disease, establish a legitimate government and adequate domestic security forces and provide public safety and order. Having done that, an occupying power can then withdraw, unless invited to stay and assist in reconstruction by the country’s recognized sovereign government. Once we’ve done that in Iraq, we should leave.

What constitutes sufficient public safety and order in Iraq? Adequate public safety does not mean an end to all terrorism. Indeed, no country on the planet is immune from individual terrorist attacks, with the possible exception of North Korea -- which a recent survey rated the country least likely to be struck by terrorists. Apparently its regime is terrorizing enough.

We’ll know there’s sufficient public order when we can conduct the other critical post-conflict tasks: feeding the people, setting up a government and fielding an army and police force. These tasks can, in fact, be done in the presence of a terrorist threat. Governments function and civil society operates adequately in the face of chronic terrorism in a number of countries, such as Israel and Northern Ireland.

Frankly, it does not appear that the present terrorist activities in Iraq can keep these things from happening …unless Americans and Iraqis succumb to what the terrorists want: for us to cave into our fears.

Why not let the United Nations take over? The United Nations did not invade Iraq; the United States did. Therefore, America bears the ultimate responsibility for the occupation. The United Nations and others can help, but the goal should not be to internationalize the occupation, but to end it. We must avoid anything that slows down that process. The only help we need is that which speeds fulfillment of the disease-and-unrest formula.


Who will rebuild Iraq? The Iraqis. Just as Europeans and Asians rebuilt their countries after World War II, the Iraqis will bear most of the burden, hardship and sacrifice of reconstructing their country after decades of neglect under a brutal regime and the consequences of three wars. In the end the Iraqis will have to fight for their own freedom. The United States needs to get out of their way and let them secure their own destiny.

Meeting the obligations of an occupying power and then withdrawing U.S. forces is the best way to do that.

What do we do about mounting casualties? Fight smarter. Protect our troops. But in the end, casualties are part of the fight for victory.

The aftermath of war is more like war than peace. It is a time filled with uncertainty, violence and privation. It needs to be thought of like war -- and war, let’s remember, is a competition between determined, thinking enemies. It’s a contest of action and counteraction. Human losses are always the measure of these terrible struggles. It is naive to assume occupations will be a frictionless, effortless endeavor. It also would be foolish to let adversity equal surrender.

American forces likely will suffer casualties until the last day of the occupation, but this does not mean that America will fail. We took casualties throughout the Cold War (search) -- yet, in the end, we prevailed. Let’s make sure the same can be said of Iraq.

James Jay Carafano is the Senior Fellow for Defense and Homeland Security at the Heritage Foundation and the author of Waltzing into The Cold War: The Struggle for Occupied Austria.

[sunnyday]

The press didn't influence me to disapprove of the war; I can think for myself. I'm glad that more people are agreeing.

[rainstorm]

A U.S. RETREAT?

By PETER BROOKES
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November 17, 2003 -- IS Uncle Sam getting a bit weak in the knees after hitting a rough patch in Iraq? The abrupt recall of Coalition Provisional Authority czar Paul Bremer to Washington for emergency consultations must have left jihadists cheering and Ba'athists guerrillas high-fiving each other.
From Vietnam (1973) to Lebanon (1983) to Somalia (1993), America's enemies have come to believe the United States has no stomach for casualties - that we are nothing more than a paper tiger.

Now they wonder if the Americans are looking to cut and run from Iraq (2003) by turning over power to the Iraqis as soon as possible - perhaps even prematurely.

Handing over the reins of government before Iraq is stabilized - and before the Iraqis are ready to run it - would be a mistake. No matter how politically expedient it may be to bring U.S. troops home quickly, we can't allow ourselves to hurry so much that we fall short of our real goal: an open, free Iraq.

Doing anything less than assuring Iraq's transition to a fully-functioning, stable democracy in the heart of the troubled Middle East would be a major strategic blunder in the long term.

Of course, we want to return sovereignty to the Iraqis as soon as possible. But turning power over to an incompetent authority is a recipe for disaster.

From all accounts, the Iraqi Governing Council (IGC) is not ready for prime time: For now, at least, it's incapable of administering Iraq and dealing with the growing insurgency.



A rapid collapse of America's commitment to Iraq would:

* Create a power vacuum in the region. Ba'athist loyalists, terrorists (al Qaeda and others), Iran, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Syria would rush to fill the void.

* Likely precipitate an Iraqi civil war between the Sunnis, the Shi'a and the Kurds. Iraq could be come another Bosnia, a country fractured by ethnic and religious civil war that has now been a ward of the international community for eight long years.

* Shatter American credibility worldwide, but especially in the Middle East.

Not to mention its effect on the War on Terror. Leaving before the job is done could also produce a new terrorist breeding ground: As in pre-9/11 Afghanistan, an abandoned Iraq could beget the likes of the Taliban and al Qaeda.

We can't afford ever again to cede terrorists a safe haven where they can gather, train, plan and operate. That is not what we want for the Iraqis, for ourselves or for the Free World.

Just the perception of a weakening of America's long-haul commitment to Iraq is already having a ripple effect. For example, despite Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld's first trip to Tokyo, the Japanese seem to have gotten cold feet - they've put off until next year making good on their promise to send support troops to Iraq.

Perhaps more important: South Korea - Rumsfeld's second whistle-stop - is wavering on the U.S. request to send up to 5,000 combat troops to Iraq.

The Bush administration must follow through on its commitment to bring peace and stability to Iraq. There can be no perception of wavering. In fact, this should start with ending the use of the term "Iraqification."

This expression smacks of "Vietnamization," under which U.S. forces withdrew from Vietnam in 1973, turning over defense to the South Vietnamese. We all know how that one ended.

The United States must continue to train fully functional Iraqi security forces. Although it seems the majority of the 5,000 insurgents are Iraqi, the Coalition must also find ways to stem the inflow of foreign jihadists from Syria and elsewhere. We also have to secure the numerous ammunition depots around the country, ensuring that these weapons don't fall into the hands of the enemy.

And despite initial rebuffs, America must continue efforts to get additional contributions of combat soldiers into Iraq. One option: Expanding NATO's role in Afghanistan beyond Kabul could free up some American special forces to fight the terrorists in Iraq.

The United States will have to stay in harm's way until the mantle of leadership for governance and security can be turned over to a competent Iraqi authority - not a day sooner. Every other option boils down to wishful thinking.

Success is the only sound exit strategy.